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Abstract
Motivated by the U.S. events of the 2000s, we address whether a too low for too long interest
rate policy may generate a boom-bust cycle. We simulate anticipated and unanticipated monetary
policies in state-of-the-art DSGE models and in a model with bond ￿nancing via a shadow banking
system, in which the bond spread is calibrated for normal and optimistic times. Our results suggest
that the U.S. boom-bust was caused by the combination of (i) too low for too long interest rates,
(ii) excessive optimism and (iii) a failure of agents to anticipate the extent of the abnormally
favorable conditions.
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Many observers have suggested that the Federal Reserve has kept short-term interest rates too low for
too long in the early 2000s, inducing the credit boom that eventually led to the post-2007 ￿nancial
and economic bust known as the Great Recession. For example, Taylor (2009) shows that following
the 2001 recession, the federal funds rate (FFR) has been unusually below the level prescribed by the
standard Taylor rule during 2002-2005, and that in the counterfactual scenario of a Taylor rule-driven
policy there would not be a comparable boom and bust.
While persistently low interest rates encourage excessive leverage and risk taking, both apparent in
the 2000s boom, monetary policy has surely not been the only cause of the boom and bust. A variety
of authors (from academics ￿ e.g. Borio, 2008 and Blanchard, 2009 ￿ to policy-makers ￿ e.g. Trichet,
2009, Bean et al., 2010 and Bernanke, 2010) have argued that the crisis resulted from the interaction
of macro and micro factors.1 Macro factors include, besides the persistently loose policy, the global
imbalances and savings glut, the ￿nancial globalization, and the hangover from the Great Moderation.
Micro factors include the boom of securitization, the development of a vast shadow banking system
with unregulated institutions, products and markets, the increased complexity of innovative ￿nancial
products with the di￿culty to measure and locate ￿nancial risk, and myopic and biased incentives
within ￿nancial institutions (see e.g. de Larosiere et al., 2009 and de Larosiere, 2010).
As Semmler and Bernard (2012, p. 442-3) put it, in all boom-bust episodes ￿the boom period triggers
overcon￿dence, overvaluation of assets, over-leveraging, and the underestimation of risk; then follows
a triggering event and the market mood turns pessimistic￿; in the U.S. during the 2000s, ￿The complex
securities (...) have, jointly with the changes in the macroeconomic environment, actually accelerated
not only the boom, but also the bust￿.
We focus on monetary policy as one key element of the macro environment in the 2000s that may
have helped triggering the boom and the bust, as its relative role is still an open issue ￿ see e.g. the
discussion in the 2010 Jackson Hole Symposium, especially between Bean et al. (2010) and Taylor
(2010). In particular, the role of monetary policy in the 2000s boom-bust has not been addressed in
the context of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model.
Against this background, this paper assesses the role of a too low for too long interest rate policy in the
development of a boom and bust, by means of quantitative simulations of DSGE models. We start by
1 See Borio (2008) and Brunnermeier (2009) for a chronology of the events relating to the subprime crises.
2assessing whether such a policy may trigger a boom-bust in state-of-the-art DSGE models, namely two
versions of the Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2010) model (CMR hereafter): one version including
a banking system in the spirit of Bernanke et al. (1999) (henceforth BGG) and thus the well-known
￿nancial accelerator, and another version without such a sector, that corresponds closely to the Smets
and Wouters (2003) model. After demonstrating their di￿culty to engender ￿nancial boom-busts, we
suggest a DSGE model that extends the CMR model with a shadow banking system. Speci￿cally, our
model includes a bond market populated by investment banks that ￿nance part of the entrepreneurial
sector activity. We realistically calibrate the model for normal times and for times of over-optimism, on
the basis of the cyclical sensitivity of the spread in bond ￿nance over the long run and during the 2000s’
boom. When excessive optimism in ￿nancial markets is coupled with a too low for too long interest
rate policy, the model generates a boom-bust in the price of capital, investment and output, associated
with a strong rise in leverage alongside a fall in the bond ￿nance spread. Our main contribution in
this paper is, thus, suggesting a DSGE model that reconciles the state-of-the-art models with ￿nancial
and economic boom-bust events.
To conduct our simulations, the concepts of too low and of too long must be precisely de￿ned from
the outset. We take too low to mean a constant policy interest rate below its steady-state level, not
responding to economic conditions and, as such, deviating from the interest rate that would result
from the monetary policy rule in force. Speci￿cally, to approximate the events of the post-2001 boom,
we simulate a FFR 100 basis points below its steady-state level: in fact, when the U.S. economy was
exiting the 2001 recession, the FFR target was 2 percent and then it was further lowered to 1 percent
from June 2003 onward (see ￿gure 1). We take too long to mean that such policy interest rate path
lasts for 6 quarters; the period is too lengthy in the sense that in its course, real activity and in￿ation
start reacting, which, in normal times, would imply a reaction of monetary policy according to the
rule in e￿ect. In our simulations, the Taylor-type policy rule is only reactivated after the 6-quarters
period of too low interest rate; then, the economy eventually returns to its steady state. 2
In the literature, there are two traditions for simulations such as ours, namely (a) an unanticipated
policy scenario and (b) an anticipated policy scenario.
The unanticipated policy scenario corresponds to a simulation in the spirit of Sims and Zha (2006)
2 Throughout the paper all the policy simulations will consist of a 6-quarters period of constant policy rate below
its steady-state level. The length of the simulation exercise is arbitrary, but in line with comparable experiments in the
literature (see e.g. Laseen and Svensson, 2011). Furthermore, we have checked that plausible variations of the simulation
period (ranging from 4 to 8 quarters) do not change qualitatively the results.
3and Bernanke et al. (1997, 2004), in which the short-term interest rate is kept constant and away
from its steady-state level for some periods by means of a sequence of unanticipated policy shocks.
Economically, it mimics a situation in which agents do not know how long the monetary ease will last,
and are continuously surprised during the ease and, also, at its end. The anticipated policy scenario
corresponds to a simulation in the spirit of Laseen and Svensson (2011), in which the policy projection
is a credibly pre-announced policy rate path. Economically, it represents situations where the policy-
maker transparently announces that it plans to implement a particular policy rate path and this plan
is believed and anticipated by the private sector. 3
It could be argued that the unanticipated policy scenario is inappropriate for the speci￿c case that
we study. In fact, the U.S. monetary policy of the ￿rst half of the 2000s is seen by many as a case
of an anticipated persistent monetary ease, as the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) held
the FFR target consistently at 1 percent between June 2003 and June 2004, and stated on August,
September, October and December 2003 that it believed policy accommodation could be maintained for
a considerable period (see panel A of table 1). However, in its January and March 2004 meetings, the
FOMC surprised the markets, changing the tone by delivering a new statement in which it mentioned
the eventual removal of its policy accommodation. As ￿gure 1 shows, short-term interest rates (and
overall bond yields, not depicted) started increasing after March 2004, even though the FFR target
has increased only in June 2004. The rise in yields thus anticipated the change in policy and happened
because of an unanticipated change in the FOMC tone in January that became clear only in March.
Overall, we argue that the U.S. monetary policy in the early 2000s may not be considered clearly pre-
announced and entirely anticipated by economic agents. First, both the beginning and the end of the
monetary ease are hard to locate precisely from the FOMC minutes, given the evolution of decisions
and statements showed in panel A of table 1. Second, many agents and markets actually changed
their behavior before the actual end of the 2003-2004 monetary loosening, seemingly surprised by the
announcement of a change in the monetary policy stance. Hence, we consider the monetary policy
of the early 2000s in the U.S. as an intermediate case between anticipated and unanticipated policy:
during part of the monetary ease most agents knew that policy would be loose for a prolonged period,
but it is very hard to argue that most agents knew for sure the future policy path from its outset. 4
3 Another sort of possible policy simulations are those of Reis (2009) and Milani and Treadwell (2012), who study
the e￿ects of news about future monetary policies.
4 A di￿erent case could be made regarding the 2011-12 monetary ease, as, in our view, the information in panel B
suggests that the announcements of future monetary policy by the FOMC in 2011 and 2012 conform more closely to
an anticipated loosening of monetary policy. In fact, in August, September, November and December 2011, the FOMC
4All considered, throughout the whole paper we implement both the unanticipated and the anticipated
policy simulations, for all models considered, explicitly comparing their results. A ￿rst advantage of
our approach is that considering both simulations may allow for a better approximation to the real
world events of the 2000s. A second advantage is that simulating both policies allows for assessing
whether the anticipation of the policy path in￿uences its dynamic impacts; and, as a corollary, allows
for drawing lessons regarding the communication of future monetary actions.
The key conclusions of the paper may be summarized as follows. First, in line with the literature,
anticipated periods of too low for too long interest rates generate a very much larger and quicker boom
in real activity and asset price than similar policies that are unanticipated. Second, the state-of-the-
art DSGE models fail to predict a sizeable boom and bust following a too low for too long monetary
policy, even when extended with ￿nancial frictions. Third, our DSGE model with a shadow banking
system predicts a substantial boom and bust following a too low for too long policy, when adequately
calibrated with a cyclical sensitivity of the spread in bond ￿nance in line with the 2002-2007 data . Our
framework therefore highlights the central role that spreads may have on the transmission of monetary
policy, as recently suggested by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012b).
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we simulate anticipated and unan-
ticipated policies of too low for too long interest rates in two versions of the CMR (2010) model,
after brie￿y discussing their main features relevant for the issue addressed in this paper. In section 3
we present our model, which extends the CMR model adding a shadow banking system as a second
￿nancial sector in addition to the standard Bernanke et al. (1999) banking system; we calibrate the
model for normal times and for periods of excessive optimism such as those seen in the ￿rst part of the
2000s; and we simulate policies of too low for too long interest rates and discuss the results. Finally,
we present some concluding remarks in section 4. 5
2 State-of-the-art DSGE models
In this section we assess whether a too low for too long interest rate policy generates a boom and a bust
in state-of-the-art DSGE models. In subsection 2.1 we brie￿y describe the models we focus on. Then
stated that it foresaw that economic conditions were likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate
at least through mid-2013 and in January, March and April 2012 extended that period through late 2014.
5 Appendix A presents the complete model, while technical details are relegated to appendix B.
5in subsection 2.2 we explain the two alternative policy simulations, we show the impulse responses and
discuss the results.
2.1 The models
The DSGE models that are currently the benchmark macroeconomic models resulted from the fusion
of the Real Business Cycle models of the 1980s with the New Keynesian sticky-price models of the
early 1990s. Some current versions still feature frictionless ￿nancial markets and a passive role for
￿nancial intermediaries, thus being utterly unsuitable for the analysis of ￿nancial booms and busts.
This is the case of DSGE models currently used for monetary policy analysis at the main central banks
￿ e.g. the SIGMA model at the FED (Erceg et al., 2006), the Smets and Wouters model at the ECB
(Smets and Wouters, 2003) and the Bank of England’s Quarterly Model (Harrison et al., 2005).
Following the seminal paper of BGG, who include a banking sector that ampli￿es the e￿ects of monetary
shocks via a mechanism termed ￿nancial accelerator, the structure and role of the ￿nancial sector in
DSGE models has been developed along several lines. Iacoviello (2005) extended the BGG model by
introducing collateral constraints for ￿rms, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). CMR (2003, 2008 and
2010) and Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) considered a perfectly competitive banking sector that
o￿ers agents a variety of ￿nancial assets with di￿erent returns, while Kobayashi (2008) and Gerali et al.
(2010) considered imperfect competition in the banking sector so as to model the setting of interest
rates by banks. Curdia and Woodford (2010) allowed for a time-varying spread between deposits and
lending rates. Finally, a number of papers (see, for instance, Van den Heuvel, 2008, de Walque et al.,
2010, Meh and Moran, 2010 and Gertler and Karadi, 2011) studied the role of bank capital in the
transmission of macroeconomic shocks.
Most importantly for our purposes, we consider and take the Financial Accelerator Model described
in CMR (2010) as the state-of-the-art DSGE model. It essentially corresponds to the models in Smets
and Wouters (2003) and Christiano et al. (2005) enlarged with the ￿nancial accelerator mechanism
developed by BGG.
Given the widespread awareness of the CMR model, we skip any analytical or detailed presentation,
except for the retail banking system that forms its ￿nancial core. Very brie￿y, the model is composed
of households, ￿nal- and intermediate-good ￿rms, capital producers, entrepreneurs, banks, and gov-
ernment. Households consume, save and supply labor services monopolistically. They employ their
6savings in time deposits o￿ered by retail banks. On the production side, monopolistically competitive
intermediate-good ￿rms use labor (supplied by households) and capital (rented from entrepreneurs) to
produce a continuum of di￿erentiated intermediate goods. Perfectly competitive ￿nal-good ￿rms buy
intermediate goods and produce the ￿nal output, which is then converted into consumption, invest-
ment and government goods. Capital producers combine investment goods with undepreciated capital
purchased from entrepreneurs to produce new capital, which is then sold back to entrepreneurs. Cap-
ital services are supplied by entrepreneurs, who own the stock of physical capital and choose how
intensively to use it. Entrepreneurs purchase capital using their own resources as well as external ￿-
nance, namely bank loans. Government expenditures represent a constant fraction of ￿nal output and
are ￿nanced by lump-sum taxes imposed to households, with the government budget systematically
balanced. The Central Bank sets the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor-type interest rate
rule.
Banks ￿nance the part of the entrepreneurs’ purchases of physical capital that cannot be ￿nanced
with their net worth. Entrepreneurial loans are risky because the returns on their investments are
subject to idiosyncratic shocks, which, if unfavorable and large enough, may lead to bankruptcy and
thus incapacity to pay the required interest and re-pay their debt. Financial frictions arise because
the idiosyncratic shock is observed by the entrepreneurs at no cost, while the bank has to incur in
a monitoring cost to observe the shock. To deal with the problem of asymmetry in information,
entrepreneurs and bank sign a debt contract, according to which the entrepreneur commits to pay
back the loan principal and a non-default interest rate, unless he declares default, in which case the
bank veri￿es the residual value of the entrepreneur’s assets and takes in all of the entrepreneur’s net
worth, net of monitoring costs.
The retail bank funds its lending activity by issuing time deposits held by households. Although
individual entrepreneurs are risky, the bank itself is not: by lending to a large number of entrepreneurs,
the bank can diversify the idiosyncratic risk and thus can guarantee a safe return on households’
deposits. Nevertheless, ￿nancial frictions ￿ re￿ecting the costly state veri￿cation problem between
entrepreneurs and the bank ￿ imply that bank hedges against credit risk by charging a premium over
the rate at which it can borrow from households.
As shown by Bernanke et al. (1999), the ￿rst order condition of the contracting problem yields the
following relationship linking the expected return on capital ( R
k;HR
t+1 ) relative to the risk-free interest
7rate (Re
t+1) and the entrepreneurs’ leverage ratio (
Q  k0;t
 K
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t+1
NHR
t+1
):
Et

1 + R
k;HR
t+1

1 + Re
t+1
= 	
 
Q  k0;t  KHR
t+1
NHR
t+1
!
;
where Q  k0;t,  KHR
t+1 and NHR
t+1 denote, respectively, the price of capital, the entrepreneur’s stock of capital
and the entrepreneur’s net worth and the function 	 is such that 	
0
> 0 for NHR
t+1 < Q  k0;t  KHR
t+1. The
ratio
Et(1+R
k;HR
t+1 )
1+Re
t+1 , which Bernanke et al. (1999) interpreted as the external ￿nance premium faced
by the entrepreneur, depends positively on the entrepreneur’s leverage ratio. All else equal, higher
leverage means higher exposure, implying a higher probability of default and thus a higher credit risk,
which leads the bank to require a higher return on lending.
In the CMR model, the cost of borrowing ￿uctuates endogenously with the cycle due to two general
equilibrium mechanisms.
The ￿rst, and quantitatively more important, is the BGG ￿nancial accelerator e￿ect, whereby changes
in the asset price change the value of the collateral that the entrepreneur can pledge and, thus, the
contractual loan rate. A positive shock to the asset price, resulting for instance from a monetary
easing, increases the entrepreneur’s net worth and decreases the external ￿nance premium, which in
turn stimulates the demand for investment. The increase in net worth also reduces the expected default
probability and allows the entrepreneur to take on more debt and to further expand investment. Hence,
an accelerator e￿ect arises, as the boom in investment raises the asset price, further pushing up the
entrepreneur’s net worth and, thus, investment.
The second mechanism, quantitatively less important and absent in BGG, is a Fisher (1933) debt
de￿ation e￿ects that arise from the fact that debt contracts are set in nominal terms. Since the return
received by households on their deposits is nominally non-state contingent, while loans to entrepreneurs
are state-contingent, unexpected movements in the price level change the ex-post real burden of en-
trepreneurial debt and, hence, the entrepreneur’s net worth. For example, after an unexpected increase
in in￿ation, the real resources transferred from the entrepreneur to households fall and consequently
the entrepreneur’s net worth increases. 6
The ￿nancial accelerator and Fisher e￿ect reinforce each other in the case of shocks that move in￿ation
and output in the same direction (e.g. monetary policy shocks), whereas they counterbalance each
6 Iacoviello (2005) and Gerali et al. (2010) also consider this e￿ect.
8other in the case of shocks that move in￿ation and output in opposite directions ( e.g. technology
shocks). Evidently, a persistently loose monetary policy should have ampli￿ed e￿ects in the CMR
model, compared with a similar model without the banking sector.
In what follows, we simulate the too low for too long interest rate policies in the version of the CMR
that includes the BGG ￿nancial accelerator (henceforth CMR-FA) and in a version without the retail
banking system, which is very close to the model of Smets and Wouters (2003) (termed CMR-Simple). 7
The purpose is to isolate the e￿ect of the retail banking system in the transmission of the persistently
loose monetary policy, as well as to assess whether it depends on the ability of agents to anticipate the
policy.
2.2 Policy simulations
We now conduct two simulations for each model, namely the unanticipated policy scenario and the
anticipated policy scenario. In both, the policy (risk-free) nominal interest rate is held constant below
its steady-state level by 100 basis points for 6 quarters; afterward, the nominal interest rate set by
the central bank re-starts being determined by the following Taylor-type policy rule, which includes
interest rate smoothing and responses of the policy rate to deviations of expected in￿ation ( Ett+1)
and current output (Yt) from their steady states:
Re
t = ~ Re
t 1 + (1   ~ )

Re +  (Ett+1    ) + y
 
Yt    Y

+ "MP
t ;
where Re,   and  Y are the steady-state values of Re
t, t and Yt, respectively,  and y are the weights
assigned to expected in￿ation and output, ~  captures interest rate smoothing and "MP
t is a monetary
policy shock. Based on CMR, we calibrate ~  to 0:88 and  and y to 1:82 and 0:11, respectively (we
maintain this policy rule throughout the whole paper).
The unanticipated policy simulation mimics a situation in which agents do not know how long the
monetary ease will last, and are continuously surprised during the whole policy path. Technically,
the policy interest rate is held constant by means of a sequence of shocks "MP
t determined residually
at each of the 6 periods of the simulation. These are unanticipated by economic agents, who then
7 Compared to the original CMR model, both versions also exclude long-run growth, the ￿xed cost in the produc-
tion function and distortionary taxes on capital, labor income and household consumption. While not changing the
model’s dynamic responses to monetary policy shocks, these simpli￿cations reduce its complexity. The Dynare codes for
replicating all the results in this paper are available from the authors upon request.
9change their inter-temporally optimizing decisions each period accordingly. The anticipated policy
simulation mimics a situation in which the policy-maker announces a speci￿c policy rate path and it
is entirely believed by the private sector. Technically, the policy path is written as a function of the
initial state of the economy, which includes a set of anticipated shocks to the policy rule consistent
with the announced path, i.e. the set

"MP
t
6
t=1 is perfectly known to agents at t = 0. As agents
know the shocks and the policy rate path from the outset, including the return of monetary policy to
the prevailing rule after the ease, they adjust their optimizing decisions immediately after the credible
announcement.
Figure 2 plots the impulse response functions of the most important variables ￿ nominal interest
rate, output, investment, in￿ation, price of capital (the model’s indicator for the price of assets in
the ￿nancial market) and, for the CMR-FA version, the interest rate on loans and the entrepreneurs’
leverage and loans.
A ￿rst conclusion that stands out is that anticipated policies (panel A) generate a much larger and
immediate response of macroeconomic and ￿nancial variables than unanticipated policies (panel B).
This is in line with results elsewhere in the literature (see Laseen and Svensson, 2011, ￿g. 3), and it
was expected: when policy is anticipated, agents change immediately their decisions knowing that the
nominal interest rate will be below its steady-state level and unresponsive to the state of the economy
for 6 quarters. Output, investment and in￿ation react with a hump-shaped pattern in both simulation
scenarios, even though peaking sooner and at a very much higher level when policy is anticipated.
While the behavior of net worth is similar, the price of capital behaves quite di￿erently in the two
simulations: when the too low for too long interest rate policy is unanticipated, it jumps slightly on
impact and then is virtually constant until the end of the monetary ease, then re-converging to its
steady-state level; when policy is anticipated, the price of capital jumps markedly on impact (by a
factor of 5 compared to the alternative scenario) and then falls rapidly and goes through a small bust,
before converging to the steady state. Clearly, no scenario predicts a gradual build up of the price of
capital as apparently was the case during the 2000s boom.
A second conclusion is that the BGG’s ￿nancial accelerator has a rather limited ampli￿cation e￿ect
in the CMR model. The impulse response functions of output, in￿ation and price of capital in the
CMR-FA and the CMR-Simple model are quite similar, irrespectively of the (un)anticipation of the
monetary policy path. When policy is anticipated, in the model with the banking system there is a
larger jump on impact of the price of capital, while when policy is unanticipated not only the initial
10jump is slightly larger but there is also some build up in the price of capital until the end of the
monetary ease ￿ but the di￿erences are not striking. In both policy scenarios, investment reacts with a
hump-shaped pattern, and it peaks at a rather higher level in the CMR-FA model ￿ here, the di￿erence
is more noteworthy.
A third conclusion, related with the previous, is that including a BGG banking system in the state-
of-the-art DSGE model is not su￿cient for a period of too low for too long interest rates to induce a
dynamics of the price of capital and investment ￿ let alone output and in￿ation ￿ akin to the one seen
in the boom and bust of the 2000s.
A fourth and key conclusion is that, irrespectively of the ability of agents to anticipate the policy
path, the CMR-FA model predicts that a too low for too long interest rate policy induces a fall in the
leverage of entrepreneurs during the period of booming investment, output and prices (of ￿nal good
and of capital). This is clearly at odds with the huge overall increase in leverage that occurred in
the U.S. during the ￿rst half of the 2000s. In fact, it is at odds with the stylized facts of all boom
episodes, namely overcon￿dence, overvaluation of assets, over-leveraging, and the underestimation
of risk (Semmler and Bernard, 2012). We thus conclude that the state-of-the-art DSGE model has
important di￿culties to scrutinize the boom and bust events such as the one in the U.S. during the
2000s.8 Hence the motivation for our model proposed and analyzed in the next section.
3 A DSGE model with a shadow banking system
In this section we suggest a DSGE model that realistically features over-optimism and over-leveraging
in the course of the boom. The section has three subsections. In the ￿rst, we present the new part of the
model, namely the shadow banking system that parallels the retail banking system; special attention
is given to the modeling of normal times as opposed to times of optimism associated with booms. In
the second, we present the calibration, again focusing on the working of the shadow banking system
in normal and optimistic times. Finally, we present the simulation of anticipated and unanticipated
monetary policies of too low for too long interest rates and discuss the results.
8 Descriptions of the U.S. boom-bust of the 2000s typically emphasize the excessive risk taking and leverage of
￿nancial institutions, rather than of non-￿nancial economic agents (as are the entrepreneurs in these DSGE models).
Stylized as the model might be with this respect, one should not forget that the ￿nancial intermediaries’ leverage is a
sign of the leverage took on by the ultimate economic agents, ￿rms and households who buy goods and services.
113.1 The model
Figure 3 sketches the structure of the model. Agents and ￿ows depicted in solid lines correspond to
the CMR-FA model discussed in section 2, while dashed lines represent the innovations of our model.
In short, we augment the CMR-FA model with a shadow banking system, which may be thought of
as representing the intermediation of funds between households and part of the entrepreneurial sector
through securitized ￿nance. 9 Our model’s ￿nancial system is thus composed of two di￿erent ￿nancial
sectors ￿ loan and bond market ￿ with di￿erent ￿nancial intermediaries ￿ retail and investment banks ￿
that intermediate ￿nancial ￿ows (granting loans and underwriting bonds) between households (lenders)
and two groups of entrepreneurs (borrowers).
The setting up of the shadow banking system is paralleled by the division of the entrepreneurial
sector into two groups, each having access to one of the sources of external funding. Usually, in the
corporate ￿nance literature (see, among many others, Diamond, 1991, Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994,
Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997, Berlin and Loeys, 1988, Bolton and Freixas, 2000, 2006 and Hale, 2007),
￿rms are segmented by risk classes in their choice of funding, with safer ￿rms having access to bond
￿nancing and riskier ￿rms resorting to bank loans. Accordingly, we assume that riskier entrepreneurs
(henceforth HR, to denote high risk) obtain ￿nancing via retail bank loans, while safer entrepreneurs
(henceforth LR ￿ low risk) issue bonds resorting to investment banks. 10 The entrepreneurs that resort
to retail bank ￿nancing have higher risk because, as seen in section 2, they may default due to a low
realization of the productivity shock. We model the remaining set of entrepreneurs as safer assuming
that they always have enough net worth to repay their debt, i.e. they never default. Accordingly, in
equilibrium, safer entrepreneurs obtain ￿nance at a lower interest rate than riskier entrepreneurs.
The shadow banking system is populated by a continuum of monopolistic competitive investment
banks, who set the coupon rate on bonds seeking to maximize pro￿ts. These are then rebated to the
9 The expression ￿shadow banking system￿ has been suggested originally by Paul McCulley of PIMCO at the 2007
Jackson Hole conference, where he de￿ned it as ￿the whole alphabet soup of levered up non-bank investment conduits,
vehicles, and structures￿ (McCulley, 2007, pag. 2). The shadow banking system in our model is very stylized and does
not come anywhere near the variety and complexity of products, institutions and markets that exist in reality (see Pozsar
et al., 2010 for a comprehensive and up-to-date description of the shadow banking system). For example, during the
2000s’ boom in the U.S., a large part of assets intermediated by the shadow banking system were related to the housing
market, involving mortgage-backed securities, while our model does not feature a housing market. The modeling of the
shadow banking system stems from the macroeconomic nature of our model: adding into a DSGE model a too complex
shadow banking system would be highly demanding and hardly cost-e￿ective given that we want to focus on aggregate
phenomena.
10 Typically, a ￿rm going public hires an investment bank to sell its securities. The investment bank (the underwriter)
acts as an intermediary between the issuing ￿rm and the ultimate investors. The most common type of underwriting
arrangement is the ￿rm commitment underwriting, according to which the underwriter buys the entire stock of bonds
from the ￿rm and resells it to investors at a higher price ( i.e., at a lower interest rate). This spread represents the
investment bank’s pro￿ts. See Ellis et al. (2000) for an in-depth analysis of the underwriting process.
12stockholders, i.e. to the households. The assumption of monopolistic competition in the bond market
is consistent with the empirical evidence about the U.S. market of bond underwriting. For example,
Fang (2005) shows that the largest ￿ve investment banks underwrite more than 60% of all deals, and
the largest ￿fteen banks account for roughly 95% of all deals. The decision of the bond coupon rate is
taken by the investment bank manager, whom we call henceforth the underwriter. In our framework,
the coupon interest rate of the bond is set as a markup over the risk-free interest rate. We defer to
the end of this subsection and, most especially, to the next subsection, details on the spread in bond
￿nance. For now, we make three brief notes about the bond ￿nance spread. First, its behavior will
be crucial for the dynamics of the model. Second, the data clearly reveal that it is time-varying and
counter-cyclical (see ￿gure 4). Third, the data also tell that in times of over-optimism, the elasticity
of the spread to the business cycle is larger than in normal times.
In what follows we only describe the shadow banking system and the agents involved in this new block
of the economy. The rest of the model is standard in the literature (corresponds to the CMR-FA
model) and is set out in appendix A.
We assume that riskier entrepreneurs are a fraction  of the total population of entrepreneurs, so that
the share of safer entrepreneurs is 1 . The superscripts ￿LR￿ and ￿LR;l￿ refer to variables associated
with the safer entrepreneurs.
Safer entrepreneur’s pro￿t maximization problem
At the beginning of period t, the representative l-th LR entrepreneur provides capital services to
intermediate-good ￿rms. Capital services, K
LR;l
t , are related to the entrepreneur’s stock of physical
capital,  K
LR;l
t , according to K
LR;l
t = u
LR;l
t  K
LR;l
t , where u
LR;l
t denotes the level of capital utilization.
When choosing the capital utilization rate, the entrepreneur takes into account the increasing and
convex utilization cost function a

u
LR;l
t

, that denotes the cost, in units of ￿nal goods, of setting the
utilization rate to u
LR;l
t .11
Then, at the end of period t, the entrepreneur sells the undepreciated capital to capital producers at
price Q  k0;t, pays the nominal coupon rate (R
coupon
t ) on bonds issued and purchases new capital from
11 The functional form that we use is a

u
LR;l
t

= rk;LR
LR
a

exp
LR
a

u
LR;l
t  1

 1

, where rk;LR is the steady-state
value of the rental rate of capital, a(1) = 0, a
00
(1) > 0 and LR
a = a
00
(1)=a
0
(1) is a parameter that controls the degree
of convexity of costs.
13capital producers at price Q  k0;t. The capital acquisition is ￿nanced partly by his net worth, N
LR;l
t+1 ,
and partly by issuing new bonds. The amount of bonds issued, BI
LR;l
t+1 , is given by:
BI
LR;l
t+1 = Q  k0;t  K
LR;l
t+1   N
LR;l
t+1 : (1)
The entrepreneur’s time-t pro￿ts, 
LR;l
t , are given by:

LR;l
t =
h
u
LR;l
t r
k;LR
t   a

u
LR;l
t
i
 K
LR;l
t Pt + (1   )Q  k0;t  K
LR;l
t
 Q  k0;t  K
LR;l
t+1   R
coupon
t

Q  k0;t 1  K
LR;l
t   N
LR;l
t

;
where r
k;LR
t denotes the real rental rate, Pt the price of the ￿nal good and  the depreciation rate.
In period t the entrepreneur chooses the capital utilization rate and the desired capital to use in period
t + 1 so as to maximize 
LR;l
t , taking as given the coupon rate to be paid on the bonds issued. The
￿rst order conditions with respect to u
LR;l
t and  K
LR;l
t+1 are, respectively:
r
k;LR
t = a
0 
u
LR;l
t

(2)
Q  k0;t = Et
nh
u
LR;l
t+1 r
k;LR
t+1   a

u
LR;l
t+1
i
Pt+1 + (1   )Q  k0;t+1   R
coupon
t+1 Q  k0;t
o
: (3)
Equation (2) states that the rental rate on capital services equals the marginal cost of providing those
services. As the rental rate increases it becomes more pro￿table to use capital more intensively up
to the point where the extra pro￿ts match the extra utilization costs. The capital Euler equation (3)
equates the value of a unit of installed capital at time t to the expected discounted return of that extra
unit of capital in period t + 1.
The entrepreneur’s equity at the end of period t, V
LR;l
t , is given by
V
LR;l
t =
nh
u
LR;l
t r
k;LR
t   a

u
LR;l
t
i
Pt + (1   )Q  k0;t
o
 K
LR;l
t  (1 + R
coupon
t )

Q  k0;t 1  K
LR;l
t   N
LR;l
t

:
The ￿rst term represents the rental income of capital, net of utilization costs, and the proceeds from
selling undepreciated capital to capital producers. The second term represents the payment (coupon
and principal) of the bonds issued in period t   1.
To avoid a situation in which the entrepreneur accumulates enough net worth to become self-￿nanced,
14we assume a constant probability of death: in each period, the entrepreneur exits the economy with
probability 1   
LR. In that case, he rebates his equity to households in a lump-sum way:
transfer to households =
 
1   
LR
V
LR;l
t :
To keep the entrepreneurs’ population constant, a new entrepreneur is born with probability 1 
LR.
The total entrepreneur’s net worth N
LR;l
t+1 combines total equity and a transfer, W
e;LR;l
t , received from
households, which corresponds to the initial net worth necessary for the entrepreneur’s activity to
start. The law of motion for the entrepreneur’s net worth is:
N
LR;l
t+1 = 
LRV
LR;l
t + W
e;LR;l
t :
Safer entrepreneur’s ￿nancing cost minimization problem
There is a continuum of investment banks, indexed by z 2 [0;1], and each investment bank z has
some market power when conducting its intermediation services. An entrepreneur seeking an amount
of borrowing for period t + 1 equal to BI
LR;l
t+1 , de￿ned by (1), would allocate his borrowing among
di￿erent investment banks, BI
LR;l
t+1 (z), so as to minimize the total repayment due. At the end of
period t, the entrepreneur chooses how much to borrow from bank z by solving the following problem:
min
BI
LR;l
t+1 (z)
 1
0

1 + R
coupon
t+1 (z)

BI
LR;l
t+1 (z)dz
subject to a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator
BI
LR;l
t+1 =
8
<
:
 1
0
h
BI
LR;l
t+1 (z)
i
"coupon
t+1  1
"coupon
t+1 dz
9
=
;
"coupon
t+1
"coupon
t+1  1
;
where R
coupon
t+1 (z) is the interest rate charged by the z-th bank and "
coupon
t+1 > 1 is the time-varying inter-
est rate elasticity of the demand for funds. The ￿rst order condition yields the following entrepreneur’s
demand for funds:
BI
LR;l
t+1 (z) =

1 + R
coupon
t+1 (z)
1 + R
coupon
t+1
 "
coupon
t+1
BI
LR;l
t+1 ;
15where R
coupon
t+1 is the nominal average coupon rate prevailing in the market at time t + 1, de￿ned as:
1 + R
coupon
t+1 =
 1
0

1 + R
coupon
t+1 (z)
1 "
coupon
t+1 dz
 1
1 "coupon
t+1
:
As expected, the funds demand curve has a negative slope: when the interest rate that the z-th bank
sets increases relatively to the average rate, the entrepreneur wishes to borrow less funds from that
particular bank.
Investment banks
The investment banks are owned by households. To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we follow
the recent DSGE banking literature and assume perfect competition in the market for households’
deposits in these banks (see e.g. Kobayashi, 2008). We rule out the entry and exit of investment
banks. The investment bank therefore maximizes its pro￿ts, taking as given the return to pay to the
households. In appendix A we show that the required return on bonds by households is equal to the
risk-free rate, i.e. the central bank nominal interest rate.
At the end of period t, the z-th investment bank thus solves the following pro￿t maximization problem:
max
R
coupon
t+1 (z)
IB
t+1 (z) =
n
1 + R
coupon
t+1 (z)

BI
LR;l
t+1 (z)  

1 + Re
t+1

BI
LR;l
t+1 (z)
o
subject to BI
LR;l
t+1 (z) =

1 + R
coupon
t+1 (z)
1 + R
coupon
t+1
 "
coupon
t+1
BI
LR;l
t+1 :
Deriving the ￿rst-order condition, imposing a symmetric equilibrium and rearranging yields
1 + R
coupon
t+1 =
"
coupon
t+1
"
coupon
t+1  1
 
1 + Re
t+1

; (4)
that is, the coupon rate is a time-varying markup,
"
coupon
t+1
"
coupon
t+1  1, over the policy interest rate. The pro￿ts
of the investment banking sector in period t + 1 are given by IB
t+1 =
 
R
coupon
t+1   Re
t+1

(1   )BI
LR;l
t+1
and are rebated to households.
The spread in bond ￿nance, i.e. the spread between the bond coupon rate and risk-free nominal
interest rate is
spreadt+1  R
coupon
t+1   Re
t+1 =
1
"
coupon
t+1   1
 
1 + Re
t+1

: (5)
16Equation (5) is crucial for the dynamic behavior of the model. If the elasticity of the demand for funds
in the bond market was constant, the model would predict that the spread in bond ￿nance would
depend only on the policy interest rate. Yet, it is well-known that spreads co-move with the business
cycle overall, from spreads between interest rates on short term commercial paper and Treasury bills
(see e.g. Friedman and Kuttner, 1998) to spreads between long corporate bond yields and long Treasury
yields (see e.g. Gertler and Lown, 1999). We do not attempt to provide micro-foundations for the
counter-cyclical behavior of the spread in bond ￿nance, as their multiple and complex determinants
would be very hard to pin down in a DSGE model ￿ thus deferring that task to more stylized models
of ￿nance. Rather, we adopt an empirical approach and calibrate the counter-cyclical behavior of the
spread in bond ￿nance according to U.S. data, as further detailed in the next subsection. We ￿rstly
specify a linear relation between the elasticity of demand for funds in the bond market and the cyclical
state of the economy, which rules the baseline behavior of the spread in bond ￿nance. In addition,
motivated by the above refered fact that boom periods trigger overcon￿dence, overvaluation of assets,
over-leveraging, and the underestimation of risk (see e.g. Semmler and Bernard, 2012) we distinguish
between normal times and periods of optimism (associated with ￿nancial booms). To do so, we adopt
a two-tier approach to model the counter-cyclical behavior of the spread in bond ￿nance.
First, we specify the following baseline relation between the elasticity of the demand for funds in bond
￿nance and the output gap:
"normal
t+1 =  " + 1
 
Yt    Y

; (6)
so that the interest rate on bonds in normal times, R
coupon;normal
t+1 , is given by
1 + R
coupon;normal
t+1 =
"normal
t+1
"normal
t+1   1
 
1 + Re
t+1

(7)
and the spread during normal times is
spreadnormal
t+1 =
1
"normal
t+1   1
 
1 + Re
t+1

: (8)
As further explained below, calibrating equation (6) with very long historical time series for the U.S.,
allows us to deem equations (6)-(8) as driving the cyclical sensitivity of the spread in normal times.
The second tier of our modeling strategy for the behavior of the spread in bond ￿nance consists of
proposing two additional equations that are inactive in normal times, but are activated in times of
17over-optimism. The associated under-estimation of risk and excessive leverage inexorably co-exist with
abnormally low spreads in securitized ￿nance, as has been the case in the U.S. 2000s’ boom (see e.g.
Semmler and Bernard, 2012). A multiplicity of factors may have triggered the over-con￿dent behavior
and it is beyond the scope of this paper to suggest thorough micro-foundations for over-con￿dence.
Rather, we distillate those multiple factors in what we call optimism: whenever the underwriter
becomes optimistic, he underwrites bonds at a lower that the normal coupon rate.
We model this second tier with two additional equations.
The ￿rst states that the underwriter becomes optimistic whenever the entrepreneurs are able to pledge
a higher (than the steady-state level) value as collateral. To see the potential of this assumption, note
that this could happen, for example, because the market price of collateral is increasing. We thus
model underwriter’s optimism, t, as a positive function of the entrepreneur’s net worth. Moreover,
to take into account the fact that human beliefs are very persistent (Kurz and Motolese, 2011), we
furthermore model optimism as an AR(1) process with high persistence. Accordingly, the law of
motion for optimism is given by
t = t 1 + (1   )
h
  + 2

N
LR;l
t+1   NLR;l
i
; (9)
where  ,   = 0, is the steady-state level of optimism,  captures the degree of persistence in optimism
and 2 > 0 the sensitivity of optimism with respect to the deviation of the entrepreneur’s net worth
from its steady-state value (NLR;l).
The second states that whenever the underwriter is optimistic, the elasticity of the demand for funds
in the bond market deviates positively from its normal times level:
"
optimistic
t+1 = "normal
t+1 (1 + t) : (10)
The optimistic elasticity results in a lower coupon rate, which may be seen substituting (10) into (4),
yielding the following expression
1 + R
coupon;optimistic
t+1 =
"normal
t+1 (1 + t)
"normal
t+1 (1 + t)   1
 
1 + Re
t+1

; (11)
where R
coupon;optimistic
t+1 is the coupon rate that the optimistic underwriter sets on the bonds issued.
Comparing (11) and (7), it is clear that the optimistic underwriter underwrites bonds at a lower than
18the normal interest rate.
To summarize: in the steady state, when optimism and the output gap are null, the spread in bond
￿nance is given by a constant elasticity of the demand and depends only on the central bank interest
rate; when the economy records cyclical ￿uctuations but times are normal as regards the ￿nancial
markets and economic mood, the spread moves counter-cyclically, as the elasticity moves with the
output gap according to equation (6); when some set of factors induces over-optimism, perceived as
increases in the net worth of the entrepreneurial sector, we allow the elasticity of demand for funds
in the bond market to change with optimism (in addition to changing with the cyclical state of the
economy) and therefore the discount on bond ￿nance increases further than would happen merely
because of the business cycle.
3.2 Calibration
The model is calibrated for the U.S. economy assuming the quarter as the time unit. We focus
on the calibration of the parameters associated with the shadow banking system and the fraction
of entrepreneurs that employ bond ￿nance ￿ the innovative part of our model. The values of the
remaining parameters are calibrated in line with the established New Keynesian literature and are
shown in table 2. Tables 3 and 4 report the steady-state implications of the model and their empirical
counterparts. These tables show how the model successfully reproduces most of the salient features of
the U.S. economy, namely key macroeconomic and leverage ratios, interest rates and, importantly, its
￿nancial market structure.
The share of entrepreneurs that resort to the retail banking system for ￿nance, , is set to 0:278, which
(given the bond and loan amounts in the steady state) allows us to exactly match the ratio of bank to
bond ￿nance in the U.S. economy (as reported by De Fiore and Uhlig, 2011). 12
Equations (6) and (8) show that the steady-state bond spread depends on the interest rate elasticity  ".
Chen et al. (2007) report an average annual yield spread of AAA bonds of 84 basis points. Accordingly,
we set  " to 510, so that the annual bond spread is around 84 basis points in the steady state, and
12 The values of the parameters related with this part of the entrepreneurial sector are primarily chosen to match the
cost of external ￿nance, i.e. the contractual, no-default interest rate on entrepreneurial debt ( Zt resulting from A.6).
Setting the fraction of realized payo￿s lost in bankruptcy, , to 0:15 and the standard deviation of the entrepreneur
idiosyncratic productivity shock, , to 0:55 yields Z = 6:81%=year. This is in line with the data and is realistically above
the steady-state risk-free interest rate, which is 5:16%, given that we set the discount factor  to 0:9875. Moreover,
it reasonably guarantees that, in equilibrium, bond ￿nancing is cheaper than bank ￿nancing. To match the observed
leverage ratio, we set the survival rate 
HR to 0:97.
19the steady-state coupon rate paid by the safer entrepreneurs is 5:99%=year. To match the average
leverage ratio in the data, we set the survival probability 
LR to 0:96.
When the economy is not in the steady state, the spread in bond ￿nance exhibits a counter-cyclical
dynamics. Our two-tier approach to modeling the behavior of the bond spread requires calibrating (i)
parameter 1 in equation (6), to govern the behavior of the spread in normal times, and (ii) parameter
2 in equation (9), to add a speci￿c behavior of the spread in times of over-optimism.
We calibrate the parameter 1 using very long historical time series for the U.S., so that the equation
may actually be thought of as driving the cyclical sensitivity of the bond spread in normal times.
Data are from the U.S. for 1953 through 2011, with a quarterly periodicity. Regarding the spread we
follow a recent literature that focuses on yields of corporate bonds with long average residual maturity
vis-a-vis yields of government bonds with comparable maturity (see Gilchrist et al., 2009 and Gilchrist
and Zakrajsek, 2012a). Speci￿cally, we use the di￿erence between (quarterly averages of) the Moody’s
Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond yields and the 10-Year Treasury constant maturity yields. To measure
the business cycle we consider the o￿cial output gap, i.e. the di￿erence between real output and the
real potential output estimated by the Congressional Budget O￿ce. Figure 4 shows the long time
series of bond spread and output gap, as well as the o￿cial dating of U.S. recessions by the NBER.
On average, in the 10 recessions identi￿ed by the NBER during this period, each percentage point of
decrease in the output gap has been associated with an increase in the bond spread of 0:21 percentage
points.13 Consistently, an OLS regression of the spread on a constant and the output gap yields an
estimate of  0:2 for the coe￿cient associated to the gap. In a VAR model of in￿ation, output gap,
spread and the federal funds rate, a monetary policy shock generates a counter-cyclical dynamics of the
spread which, at the height of the impacts, corresponds to a rise in the spread of 0:26 percentage points
per each percentage point of decrease in the output gap. 14 Overall, we ￿nd it reasonable to calibrate
the model so that in its baseline speci￿cation ￿ when optimism is absent ￿ a monetary policy shock
causes the output gap and the spread to move in opposite directions with each percentage point of
13 See the business cycle dating at http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html. For each recession, we compute the
di￿erence between the bond spread (gap) in the last quarter of the recession and its value in the quarter prior to the
beginning of the recession. The behavior of spreads during expansions is essentially symmetric.
14 All data have been downloaded from FRED on March 2012 (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/). The series
references are: BAA and GS10 (corporate and treasury yields); GDPC1 and GDPPOT (real and potential output);
FEDFUNDS (e￿ective federal funds rate); and PCECTPI (personal consumption expenditures price index). The monthly
yield and fed funds data have been converted to a quarterly periodicity with simple 3-month averages. In￿ation is the
year-on-year growth rate of the quarterly PCECTPI. The reported dynamic elasticities have been computed from the
impulse response functions of a VAR(3) model estimated over 1954:Q3-2011:Q4, in which the peak response of the output
gap occurs at quarter 4 and the peak response of the spread occurs at quarter 6.
20deviation of real output from its steady-state level associated with 0:22 percentage points of deviation
of the corporate bond coupon rate from the risk-free interest rate.
Simulating our model, it turns out that for 1 = 30000 an expansionary monetary policy shock
generates a hump-shaped response of the output gap and (in the opposite direction) of the bond
spread, with peak and trough respectively at quarters 3 and 4 and an implied output gap-elasticity of
the spread of  0:22 at both quarters. We thus assume 1 = 30000 for the calibration of the behavior
of the spread in bond ￿nance in normal times.
We then calibrate the parameter 2 considering only data for the 2002-2007 period, as the equations
driven by this parameter (9-11) are meant to capture times of over-optimism. As ￿gure 4 shows, in
the 2000s the spread has been abnormally counter-cyclical: in fact, in the expansion identi￿ed by the
NBER during this period (2002:Q1-2007:Q3), each percentage point of increase in the output gap has
been associated with a decrease in the bond spread of 0:95 percentage points. For 2002:Q1-2008:Q2, a
period that encompasses the boom and does not include the ￿nancial crisis, an OLS regression of the
spread on a constant and the output gap yields an estimate of  0:7 for the coe￿cient associated to
the gap.
We thus simulate the model in search for the value for 2 that mimics such degree of sensitivity. It
turns out that for 2 = 24 an expansionary monetary policy shock generates a hump-shaped response
of the output gap and a symmetric response of the bond spread, with peak and trough respectively at
quarters 3 and 5 and an implied output gap-elasticity of the spread of  0:72 at both quarters.
So, adopting this calibration, in the next subsection we simulate the e￿ects of a too low for too long
interest rate policy, anticipated and unanticipated, to assess whether the model is able to generate a
boom-bust event similar to the one of the 2000s in the U.S. Given the structure of the model, we can
easily shut down equation (9) ￿ setting 2 = 0 ￿ and thus simulate the model for normal times; and,
alternatively, setting 2 = 24 we can assess the role of the optimistic shadow banking system in the
transmission of the too low for too long monetary policy.
3.3 Policy simulations
Figures 5 and 6 plot the impulse response functions of selected variables of our model to monetary
policies of too low for too long interest rates, when the policy path is anticipated and unanticipated,
respectively. The layout of the ￿gures is identical. First, crossed lines correspond to responses of
21our model in normal times, while circled lines correspond to impulse responses in times of optimism.
Second, both ￿gures have 3 panels: the top panel relates to aggregate variables, the middle one to
variables relative to the safer entrepreneurs, and the bottom panel to variables relative to the riskier
entrepreneurs.
A ￿rst broad conclusion from the comparison of the two ￿gures is that anticipated policies generate
a much larger and immediate response of the aggregate macroeconomic and most ￿nancial variables
than unanticipated policies. This was expected and is entirely in line with what we have found for the
models scrutinized in section 2.
A second general conclusion is that the e￿ects of the too low for too long interest rate policy on
macroeconomic variables ￿ output, investment, in￿ation and price of capital ￿ are very similar to those
of the CMR-FA model, when our model with a shadow banking system is calibrated for normal times.
This happens both for unanticipated and anticipated policies. Hence, when the spread in bond ￿nance
features a counter-cyclical behavior in line with the U.S. long-run average, our model does not improve
on the CMR-FA model as regards predicting a dynamics of the price of capital and investment ￿ let
alone output and in￿ation ￿ akin to the one seen in the boom and bust of the 2000s.
However, even in times of normal behavior of the spread in bond ￿nance, our model adds relevant and
reasonable results to the CMR-FA model. This is a third key conclusion. To see that, recall that the
CMR-FA model predicts that a too low for too long interest rate policy leads to a fall in leverage and
￿ especially when policy is unanticipated ￿ a fall in loans (after an initial surge caused by the fact that
the value of capital reacts more rapidly than the entrepreneurial net worth). In our model, the response
of the riskier entrepreneurs’ leverage is quite similar to the one predicted by the CMR-FA model (this
is expected, since this part of the entrepreneurial sector closely follows the CMR-FA model). However,
the safer entrepreneurs react di￿erently: after a below-the-steady-state level for some quarters (caused
by a stronger reaction of investment and the price of capital, compared to the reaction of their net
worth), their leverage becomes higher than the steady-state level, and the amount of bonds reacts
accordingly. Most importantly, the results from our model with a shadow banking system, even in its
normal times version (crossed lines), are substantially new in the sense that the safer entrepreneurs
are not merely crowding out ￿nance from the riskier entrepreneurs. That is especially clear in ￿gure
5, when the policy is anticipated: in fact, the total amount of ￿nance in the economy (the sum of
retail bank loans and investment banks bonds), after the initial increase on impact, is never below its
steady-state level. In ￿gure 6, when the policy path is unanticipated, the response of total ￿nance
22is qualitatively similar to the one predicted by the CMR-FA model, but both the duration and the
magnitude of the transitional period of below-the-steady-state total credit is quantitatively smaller
than in the CMR-FA model.
At this point, we conclude that enhancing the state-of-the-art DSGE model with ￿nancial frictions
associated to bond ￿nance via a shadow banking system, while yielding more reasonable results,
indicates that the policy of too low for too long interest rates has not been the only cause for the boom
and bust of the U.S. in the 2000s. This was hardly unexpected, in view of the analyses mentioned at
the outset of the paper stating that the 2000s’ boom and bust resulted from the interaction of macro
and micro factors. While the too low for too long monetary policy has been one crucial macro factor, it
should be thought of as a trigger for the boom (and for the bust, when interrupted), that operated only
because there were further necessary conditions present at the microeconomic level. Also motivated by
this reason, we have set a version of the model for times of optimism in the shadow banking system,
calibrated in line with the degree of over-optimism observed in the U.S. during the boom. We now
turn to the analysis of that version (circled lines).
Let us consider ￿rst the simulation of an anticipated policy path (￿gure 5). The responses of the
variables associated with the riskier entrepreneurs are not visibly di￿erent from those simulated with
the CMR-FA model (the only exception is that the amount of loans jumps much more initially and
then falls much more and is below the steady state for a very long period). As regards the safer
entrepreneurs, optimism leads to an immediate and much larger fall in the bond coupon interest rate
and in the bond ￿nance spread. While the price of capital jumps, investment reacts with some lag ￿
due to adjustment costs ￿ which, coupled with the jump in net worth, starts by decreasing leverage.
But soon (a year after the announcement and beginning of the expansionary policy), as investment
responds and the stock of capital increases rapidly and markedly, leverage rises above the steady-
state level. The hump-shaped response of leverage puts it markedly above the steady-state level for
a very long period, peaking at around 6 years after the beginning of policy. The amount of bonds
underwritten reacts similarly to leverage and capital, with its hump at around 6 years more than 7
percent above its steady-state level. 15 In the aggregate, while not impacting strikingly on output and
in￿ation, optimism induces a signi￿cantly larger hump-shaped reaction of investment, a vastly bigger
15 Although not central for our purposes, a nice result of our model is that during the crisis ￿ the period of sharp fall
in asset prices and net worth ￿ while bank loans are below their steady-state levels, the amount of bonds issued is above
its long-run level (both when policy is anticipated and unanticipated). This is, to the best of our knowledge, the closer
a DSGE model has come to the evidence reported by Adrian et al. (2012), who found that during crises bank lending to
￿rms declines but bond ￿nancing increases.
23increase in total credit (explained by the increase of bonds) and a somewhat higher initial jump of
the price of capital. The subsequent dynamics of the price of capital is similar to the one seen in
normal times, with a rapid decay to the steady-state level, but optimism induces levels slightly higher
during the transition period. Overall, if the policy path is entirely anticipated by economic agents, our
model with optimism in the shadow banking system creates the ￿avor of a boom and bust in some key
variables, but does not produce the gradual build of the price of capital that is typically associated
with booms and the period of asset prices below long-run equilibrium that is typically associated with
busts.
The behavior of the model is quite di￿erent when agents do not anticipate the policy rate path (￿gure
6), especially regarding the safer entrepreneurs and some aggregate variables. As regards the riskier
entrepreneurs, the only di￿erences to the responses when policy is anticipated are that loans and
leverage fall by a larger amount. Regarding the safer entrepreneurs, both the bond coupon interest
rate and the spread in bond ￿nance fall more gradually but end up lower at the end of the monetary
ease (compared to when policy is anticipated) ￿ in fact, much lower in the case of the spread. The
initial fall in leverage is far smaller than when policy is anticipated; then, leverage starts increasing and
becomes above the steady-state level quite faster; the peak of its hump occurs sooner, at 20 quarters,
although at a slightly smaller level than when policy is anticipated. The amount of bonds underwritten
reacts similarly to leverage and capital, increasing quire rapidly during the 2 years after the beginning
of the policy of too low interest rates. The behavior of total credit is only slightly di￿erent, as it
increases steadily for more than 7 years, not exhibiting the faltering in the second and third year after
the beginning of the monetary ease that occurs when policy is anticipated. In the aggregate, again,
optimism does not impact visibly on output and in￿ation, and while it induces a signi￿cantly larger
hump-shaped reaction of investment, the magnitude of the rise in investment turns out to be inferior
to the one found when policy is anticipated. Yet, the major di￿erence happens in the dynamics of net
worth and the price of capital: both jump on impact and keep on increasing until the end of the period
of too low for too long interest rates ￿ which does not happen without optimism; then, they both fall
at a strong pace and , from quarter 20 onwards, they are persistently below their steady-state levels.
Hence, if the policy path is not anticipated, our model with a shadow banking system and optimism is
able to engender the gradual build of the price of capital that is typically associated with booms and
the period of prices below long-run equilibrium that is typically associated with busts.
Our analysis therefore suggests that the boom and bust in the U.S. during the 2000s has been caused
24by the combination of three factors ￿ a policy of too low for too long interest rates, a mood of excessive
optimism and a failure of agents to anticipate the duration of the abnormally favorable macro conditions
(possibly due to a failure of the FED to clearly communicate its intentions). 16
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have assessed the role of a monetary policy of too low for too long interest rates as
a trigger for a ￿nancial and economic boom, and then, when interrupted, as a trigger for a ￿nancial
and economic bust.
The events of the 2000s in the U.S. were the key motivation for our analysis. Reviewing the FOMC
decisions and statements after the 2001 recession, we argue that economic agents could hardly have
anticipated the length and amplitude of the monetary ease. We thus conduct the analysis under both
the more theoretically appealing scenario of an anticipated too low for too long policy path as well as
the more pragmatic scenario of an unanticipated too low for too long policy path.
The study has been performed in the context of DSGE models and the method consisted of simulating
anticipated and unanticipated policy paths of a constant policy interest rate 100 basis points below its
steady-state level for 6 quarters, followed by an automatic shift of monetary policy to the Taylor-type
policy rule.
We started by showing that state-of-the-art DSGE models, even when including ￿nancial frictions, fail
to predict a sizeable boom and bust after such policies. Moreover, they generate a fall in leverage
during the period of booming investment, output and prices, which is clearly at odds with the data.
We then suggested a DSGE model with a second segment in the ￿nancial system, populated by
investment banks that underwrite bonds issued by entrepreneurs with a low level of risk. We call this
sector the shadow banking system, as we deem it as representing the variety of ￿nancial ￿rms that has
16 We have submitted the model to a number of sensitivity analyses, from which we emphasize two. The ￿rst relates
to the persistence of optimism. In line with the literature on the persistence of beliefs, we have run all simulations of our
model with  = 0:7 instead of 0:9. The turning points of the impulse response functions (for the safer entrepreneurs)
of leverage, bonds issued, capital and bond spread turn out to occur sooner, but otherwise the results are qualitatively
similar. The second relates to our assumption that the capital input Kt in intermediate-good production is a composite
of two entrepreneur-speci￿c capital services: Kt =
h


u
HR;r
t  K
HR;r
t

+ (1   )

u
LR;l
t  K
LR;l
t
i 1
 , where  denotes
the degree of substitutability between the two entrepreneur-speci￿c capital services. In all simulations we have considered
 = 0:6. However, given the inexistence of a sound literature to motivate the choice for the CES aggregator of capital
stocks, we have run the simulations with two alternative values for , namely  = 0:5 and  = 0:7. This parameter
changes the bond to bank ratio in the steady state, which is unappealing ( 0:5 yields a bond/bank ratio of 1:78 and 0:7 a
ratio of bond/bank equal to 1:12). The results change only quantitatively, with the e￿ects of our shadow banking system
increasing with the steady-state ratio of bond to bank ￿nance.
25developed securitized ￿nance under loose regulation and seemingly unlimited leverage in the run-up
to the 2007 bust.
We modeled the spread in bond ￿nance according to U.S. data, adopting a two tier approach. First,
we calibrated the baseline (normal times) counter-cyclical behavior of the bond spread. Then, we
calibrated the dynamics of the spread in periods of over-optimism.
Our model adds realism to the state-of-the-art DSGE model with ￿nancial frictions, as a too low for
too long interest rates policy induces an increase in the leverage and bonds issued by the entrepreneurs
that resort to the shadow banking system. The outcome of the model when the too low for too long
interest rates policy is combined with a surge in optimism depends crucially on whether the policy
path is anticipated or not by economic agents.
When the policy is anticipated, the model comes a step further to predict a boom and bust, as total
credit (bank loans plus bonds), investment and the price of capital increase substantially more than
without optimism or in alternative models. However, the price of capital does not feature the gradual
build that is typically associated with booms nor the below-average levels typically associated with
busts. In turn, when the policy path is unanticipated, the model generates a boom-bust dynamics:
(i) output, investment and total credit increase and respond in a hump-shaped pattern; (ii) the price
of capital rises steadily while the policy interest rate is too low, and then falls abruptly to below its
steady-state level.
Our model thus suggests that the boom and bust in the U.S. during the 2000s has been caused by
the combination of three factors ￿ a policy of too low for too long interest rates, a mood of exces-
sive optimism and a failure of agents to anticipate the duration of the abnormally favorable macro
conditions.
As corollaries, we draw two lessons for monetary policy. First, it seems warranted that spreads in the
bond market should be given a more important role in the conduct and monitoring of monetary pol-
icy: spreads substantially below historical levels are associated with over-con￿dence, under-estimation
of risk, excessive leverage and an increasing likelihood of a bust ￿ and therefore should trigger some
monetary policy tightening. Second, it is crucial that policy-makers build a strong credibility and com-
municate policies with the maximum transparency: when agents are able to anticipate the policy path,
the reaction of ￿nancial and macroeconomic variables is faster and maybe larger, but the likelihood of
uncontrollable booms and busts seems smaller.
26FOMC Meeting FFR target Statement
A: 2003-2004
2003-June & 25bp a slightly more expansive monetary policy would add further
to 1% support for an economy which it expects to improve over time
from 2003-August $ at 1% policy accommodation can be maintained for a
until 2003-December considerable period
2004-January $ at 1% [the FOMC] can be patient in removing
2004-March its policy accommodation
2004-May $ at 1% policy accommodation can be removed at a pace that is
likely to be measured
2004-June % 25bp policy accommodation can be removed at a pace that is
to1:25% likely to be measured
B: 2008-2012
2008-December from 1%& the Committee anticipates that weak economic conditions
to [0; 0:25]% are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels
of the federal funds rate for some time
2009-January $ at the Committee anticipates that weak economic conditions
[0; 0:25]% are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels
of the federal funds rate for some time
from 2009-March $ at the Committee anticipates that weak economic conditions
until 2011-June [0; 0:25]% are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels
of the federal funds rate for an extended period
from 2011-August $ at the Committee anticipates that economic conditions [...]
until 2011-December [0; 0:25]% are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels
for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013
since 2012-January $ at the Committee anticipates that economic conditions [...]
[0; 0:25]% are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels
for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014
Table 1: FOMC decisions and statements in selected periods of the 2000s
Note. FOMC: Federal Open Market Committee. FFR: Fed Funds Rate. Source: http://www.federalreserve.gov
27Households Value Source Description
 0.9875 our calibration discount factor
 L (36) (endogenous) weight on disutility of labor
L 1 CMR curvature of disutility of labor
b 0.63 CMR habit persistence in consumption
w 0.75 Erceg et al. (2000) fraction of households that cannot reoptimize wage
w 1.05 CMR markup, workers
w1 0.29 CMR weight of wage indexation to steady-state in￿ation
Firms
 0.36 Levin et al. (2005) capital share in the production function
p 0.75 Erceg et al. (2000) fraction of ￿rms that cannot reoptimize price
1 0.16 CMR weight of price indexation to steady-state in￿ation
f 1.2 CMR markup, intermediate-good ￿rms
S
00
29.3 CMR curvature of investment adjustment cost function
 0.03 CMR depreciation rate on capital
 0.6 our calibration degree of substitutability between capital services
Entrepreneurs
HR
a ; LR
a 18.9 CMR curvature of capital utilization cost functions
 0.15 our calibration fraction of realized pro￿ts lost in bankruptcy

p
0:3 our calibration standard deviation of productivity shock
We;HR;r, We;LR;l 0.02 CMR transfer from households

LR 0.96 our calibration survival probability of safer entrepreneurs

HR 0.97 our calibration survival probability of riskier entrepreneurs
 0.2772 our calibration share of riskier entrepreneurs
Bond Market
 " 510 Chen et al. (2007) steady-state elasticity of the demand for funds
1 30000 our calibration sensitivity of elasticity to output gap
x 0.9 Kurz and Motolese (2011) persistence in optimism
2 24 our calibration sensitivity of optimism to entrepreneur’s net worth
  0 our calibration steady-state level of optimism
Policy
~  0.88 CMR interest rate smoothing
 1.82 CMR weight of expected in￿ation in Taylor rule
y 0.11 CMR weight of output gap in Taylor rule
g 0.2 CMR share of government consumption
Table 2: Model parameters (time unit of model: quarterly)
28Variable Model U.S. data
K=Y 5.46 10.7
C=Y 0.63 0.56
I=Y 0.17 0.25
G=Y 0.2 0.2
leverage ratio = Q  K=N 1
safer 1:26
riskier 1:35
[1.21 ; 1.77]
bond to bank ￿nance ratio 2 1.5152 1.5152
Table 3: Steady-State Properties, Model versus U.S. Data
Note. When not speci￿ed, the source for U.S. data is CMR and the sample period is 1998Q4-2003Q4.
1
CMR compute the leverage as N=(Q  K  N): We compute the leverage as in Bernanke et al. (1999).
2 Source:
De Fiore and Uhlig (2011). They report a ratio of bank to bond ￿nance of 0:66 in 1999-2007.
Variable Model U.S. data
Rate of return on capital, Rk
safer 11:38%
riskier 8:40%
10:32%
Cost of external ￿nance, Z 6:81% [7:1; 8:1]%
Time deposit, Re 5:16% 5:12%
Cost of bond ￿nance, Rcoupon 5:99% 5:96% 1
Table 4: Interest Rates, Model versus U.S. Data
Note. When not speci￿ed, the source for U.S. data is CMR and the sample period is 1987Q1-2003Q4.
1 Chen
et al. (2007) ￿nd an average yield spread of AAA bonds over the period 1995-2003 of 84 basis points. Adding
this spread to the risk-free rate (R
e) gives the value displayed in the table.
29Figure 1: E￿ective federal funds rate in the 2000s
Note. Grey bars denote NBER recessions.
30A. Anticipated policy
B. Unanticipated policy
Figure 2: Monetary policy of too low for too long interest rates in CMR
Note. Values expressed as percentage deviation from steady-state values. In￿ation is expressed as annualized percent
deviation from its steady state and the interest rates are expressed as annual percentage points. CMR-FA model: crossed
lines. CMR-Simple model: solid lines. Steady state: dashed-dotted lines.
31Figure 3: Structure of the model
Figure 4: BAA spread and output gap
Note. BAA spread: solid line. Output gap: crossed line. Grey bars denote NBER recessions.
32A. Aggregate variables
B. Safer entrepreneurs
C. Riskier entrepreneurs
Figure 5: Anticipated monetary policy of too low for too long interest rates
Note. Values expressed as percentage deviation from steady-state values. In￿ation is expressed as annualized percent
deviation from its steady state and the interest rates are expressed as annual percentage points. Model in normal times:
crossed lines. Model in optimistic times: circled lines. Steady state: dashed-dotted lines. Baseline parameters: see table
2. 33A. Aggregate variables
B. Safer entrepreneurs
C. Riskier entrepreneurs
Figure 6: Unanticipated monetary policy of too low for too long interest rates
Note. Values expressed as percentage deviation from steady-state values. In￿ation is expressed as annualized percent
deviation from its steady state and the interest rates are expressed as annual percentage points. Model in normal times:
crossed lines. Model in optimistic times: circled lines. Steady state: dashed-dotted lines. Baseline parameters: see table
2. 34Appendix A - The complete model
Final-good ￿rms
Perfectly competitive ￿rms produce the ￿nal good that is converted into household consumption goods,
investment goods, government goods, goods used up in capital utilization and in bank monitoring.
The representative ￿rm produces the ￿nal good Yt, using the intermediate goods Yi;t , and the produc-
tion technology Yt =

 1
0 Y
1
f
i;t di
f
, where f, 1 > f  1, is the markup for the intermediate-good
￿rms. The representative ￿rm chooses Yi;t to maximize its pro￿ts, taking the output price, Pt, and
the input prices, Pi;t, as given. The maximization problem of the representative ￿rm is thus given by:
max
Yi;t
PtYt  
 1
0
Pi;tYi;tdi
subject to Yt =
 1
0
Y
1
f
i;t di
f
:
Solving the pro￿t maximization problem yields the following demand function for the intermediate
good i: Yi;t =

Pi;t
Pt
 f
1 f Yt, and perfect competition in the ￿nal goods market implies that the price
of the ￿nal good can be written as:
Pt =
 1
0
P
1
1 f
i;t di
1 f
: (A.1)
Intermediate-good ￿rms
Monopolistic competitive ￿rms, indexed by i 2 [0;1], produce di￿erentiated intermediate goods using
the following production function:
Yi;t = (Ki;t)
 (Li;t)
1  ; (A.2)
where 0 <  < 1 and Ki;t and Li;t denote, respectively, the capital and labor input for the production
of good i. The capital input is assumed to be a composite of two entrepreneur-speci￿c bundles of
35capital services, KHR
i;t and KLR
i;t which in turn combine the capital services of the individual members
of the two entrepreneur sectors, K
HR;r
i;t and K
LR;l
i;t . Formally,
Ki;t =
h
1   
KHR
i;t

+ (1   )
1   
KLR
i;t
i 1

; (A.3)
where  denotes the degree of substitutability between the two entrepreneur-speci￿c bundles of capital
services and, since all entrepreneurs are identical within each group, KHR
i;t = K
HR;r
i;t and KLR
i;t =
(1   )K
LR;l
i;t .
The i-th ￿rm hires labor and rents capital in competitive markets by minimizing its production costs,
taking as given the nominal wage rate, Wt, and the real rental rates of capital, r
k;HR
t and r
k;LR
t . The
￿rm i’s optimal demand for capital and labor services solves the following cost minimization problem:
min
fLi;t;KHR
i;t ;KLR
i;t g
C () =
WtLi;t
Pt
+ KHR
i;t r
k;HR
t + KLR
i;t r
k;LR
t
subject to (A.2) and (A.3). Since all ￿rms i face the same input prices and since they all have access
to the same production technology, real marginal costs st are identical across ￿rms and are given by
st =

~ wt
1   
1  
+(1 )
"

r
k;H
t

K
HR;r
t
 1
#  
+(1 )
(Yt)
( 1)
+(1 ) 
 + (1   )
;
where ~ wt denotes the real wage.
Price setting
Prices are determined through a variant of the Calvo’s (1983) mechanism. In particular, every ￿rm
faces a constant probability, 1   p, of reoptimizing its price in any given period, whereas the non-
reoptimizing ￿rms set their prices according to the indexation rule Pi;t = Pi;t 1 ( )
1 (t 1)
1 1, where
  represents the steady-state in￿ation rate, t 1 = Pt 1=Pt 2 is the in￿ation rate from t   2 to t   1
and the parameter 1, 0  1  1, represents the degree of price indexation to steady-state in￿ation.
The i-th ￿rm that optimizes its price at time t chooses Pi;t = ~ Pi;t that maximizes the present value of
future expected nominal pro￿ts:
max
Pi;t
IGF
t = Et
1 X
=0
(p)
 t+ [(Pi;t+   St+)Yi;t+]
36subject to Yi;t+ =

Pi;t+
Pt+
 f
1 f
Yt+ ;
where Et denotes the mathematical expectations operator conditional on information available at time
t, t+ the multiplier in the households’ budget constraint, St+ the ￿rm’s nominal marginal cost and
 2 (0; 1) the discount factor. At the end of each time period, pro￿ts are rebated to households.
We consider only the symmetric equilibrium at which all ￿rms choose the same ~ Pt = ~ Pi;t. Thus, from
(A.1), the law of motion for the aggregate price index is
Pt =

(1   p) ~ P
1
1 f
t + p
h
Pt 1 ( )
1 (t 1)
1 1
i 1
1 f
1 f
:
Capital producers
A continuum of competitive capital producers produce the aggregate stock of capital  Kt. New capital
produced in period t can be used in productive activities in period t+1. At the end of period t, capital
producers purchase existing capital, xK;t, from entrepreneurs and investment goods in the ￿nal good
market, It , and combine them to produce new capital, x
0
K;t, using the following technology: x
0
K;t =
xK;t +A(It;It 1). Old capital can be converted one-to-one into new capital, while the transformation
of the investment good is subject to quadratic adjustment costs. The function A() summarizes the
technology that transforms current and past investment into installed capital.
Investment goods are purchased in the ￿nal good market at price Pt. Let Q  k0;t be the nominal price
of new capital. Since the marginal rate of transformation between new and old capital is unity, the
price of old capital is also Q  k0;t. The representative capital producer’s period- t pro￿t maximization
problem is thus given by
max
fIt+;xK;t+g
Et
1 X
=0
t+

Q  k0;t+ [xK;t+ + A(It+;It+ 1)]
 Q  k0;t+xK;t+   Pt+It+
	
: (A.4)
Let  denote the depreciation rate and note that, from (A.4), any value of xK;t+ is pro￿t maximiz-
ing. Thus considering xK;t+ = (1   )  Kt+ is consistent with both pro￿t maximization and market
clearing.
37The ￿rst order condition with respect to It is:
Et

t
 
Q  k0;tA1;t   Pt

+ t+1Q  k0;t+1A2;t+1

= 0 ;
where A1;t = @A(It;It 1)=@It and A2;t+1 = @A(It+1;It)=@It. This is the standard Tobin’s Q equation
that relates the price of capital to the marginal costs of producing investment goods. 17 The aggregate
capital stock evolves according to
 Kt+1 =   K
HR;r
t+1 + (1   )  K
LR;l
t+1 = (1   )
h
  K
HR;r
t + (1   )  K
LR;l
t
i
+ A(It;It 1) :
Riskier entrepreneurs and retail banks
The role of the representative retail bank in the model is to collect time deposits from households
in order to ￿nance riskier entrepreneur’s investment project. The bank hedges against credit risk by
charging a premium over the risk-free rate at which it can borrow from households. The risk-free rate
that the bank views as its opportunity cost to lending is a contractual nominal interest rate that is
determined at the time the bank liability to households is issued. Unlike in Bernanke et al. (1999),
this rate is not contingent on the shocks that intervene before the entrepreneurial loan matures.
At each point in time there is a continuum of heterogeneous entrepreneurs of total measure , indexed
by (HR;r). At the end of time t, each entrepreneur is characterized by his net worth, N
HR;r
t+1 , which is
used, in combination with a bank loan, to purchase the time- (t + 1) stock of capital,  K
HR;r
t+1 . After the
purchase, the entrepreneur experiences an idiosyncratic productivity shock, !
HR;r
t+1 , which transforms
the purchased capital  K
HR;r
t+1 into !
HR;r
t+1  K
HR;r
t+1 . By assumption, !HR;r is independently and identically
distributed over time and across entrepreneurs and follows a log-normal distribution, ln
 
!HR;r

N
 
 1
22 ; 2
, where  is the standard deviation of ln
 
!HR;r
.
17 We adopt the following investment adjustment costs function:
A(It;It 1) =

1   S

It
It 1

It ; S

It
It 1

=
S
00
2

It
It 1
  1
2
so that S (1) = S
0
(1) = 0 and S
00
(1) = S
00
> 0 in steady state.
38Capital utilization decision
At the beginning of period t, the representative entrepreneur provides capital services to intermediate-
good ￿rms. Capital services, K
HR;r
t , are related to the entrepreneur’s stock of physical capital by
K
HR;r
t = u
HR;r
t  K
HR;r
t , where u
HR;r
t denotes the level of capital utilization. In choosing the capital
utilization rate, the entrepreneur takes into account the increasing and convex utilization cost function
a

u
HR;r
t

, that denotes the cost, in units of ￿nal goods, of setting the utilization rate to u
HR;r
t .18
The entrepreneur chooses u
HR;r
t solving the following maximization problem:
max
u
HR;r
t
h
u
HR;r
t r
k;HR
t   a

u
HR;r
t
i
!HR;r  K
HR;r
t Pt :
After determining the utilization rate of capital and earning rent on it, the entrepreneur sells the
undepreciated part to capital producers at price Q  k0;t . The average nominal gross rate of return on
capital across all entrepreneurs is given by
1 + R
k;HR
t =
h
u
HR;r
t r
k;HR
t   a

u
HR;r
t
i
Pt + (1   )Q  k0;t
Q  k0;t 1
: (A.5)
Loan decision and the standard debt contract
At the end of period t, the entrepreneur has available net worth, N
HR;r
t+1 , which he uses to ￿nance his
capital expenditures, Q  k0;t  K
HR;r
t+1 . To ￿nance the di￿erence between expenditures and net worth, he
borrows an amount B
HR;r
t+1 = Q  k0;t  K
HR;r
t+1   N
HR;r
t+1 from the retail bank.
After the purchase, the entrepreneur experiences an idiosyncratic productivity shock, !
HR;r
t+1 , which
transforms the purchased capital  K
HR;r
t+1 into !
HR;r
t+1  K
HR;r
t+1 . Financial frictions arise from asymmetric
information between entrepreneur and bank. In particular, the entrepreneur costlessly observes his
idiosyncratic shock, whereas the bank must pay a monitoring cost ￿ which represent a fraction ,
0 <  < 1, of the entrepreneur’s gross return ￿ to observe it. The optimal ￿nancing mechanism
is a debt contract which gives the lender the right to all liquidation proceeds in the event of an
entrepreneur’s default.
18 The functional form that we use is a

u
HR;r
t

= rk;HR
HR
a

exp
HR
a

u
HR;r
t  1

 1

, where rk;HR is the steady-state
value of the rental rate of capital, a(1) = 0, a
00
(1) > 0 and HR
a = a
00
(1)=a
0
(1) is a parameter that controls the degree
of convexity of costs.
39At the end of time t, the bank o￿ers a debt contract to the entrepreneur, which speci￿es the loan
amount, B
HR;r
t+1 , and the gross interest rate on the loan, Z
HR;r
t+1 . At time t + 1, the entrepreneur
declares bankruptcy if !
HR;r
t+1 is smaller than the default threshold level,  !
HR;r
t+1 , de￿ned by
 !
HR;r
t+1

1 + R
k;HR;r
t+1

Q  k0;t  K
HR;r
t+1 = Z
HR;r
t+1 B
HR;r
t+1 : (A.6)
Therefore, if !
HR;r
t+1 >  !
HR;r
t+1 , the entrepreneur pays the lender the amount Z
HR;r
t+1 B
HR;r
t+1 and keeps the
remaining

!
HR;r
t+1    !
HR;r
t+1

1 + R
k;HR;r
t+1

Q  k0;t  K
HR;r
t+1 . On the other hand, if !
HR;r
t+1 <  !
HR;r
t+1 , the
entrepreneur defaults and receives nothing, while the bank monitors the entrepreneur and receives all
of the residual net worth (1   )

1 + R
k;HR;r
t+1

!
HR;r
t+1 Q  k0;t  K
HR;r
t+1 .
The bank raises the funds that are necessary to ￿nance the entrepreneurs activities issuing time deposits
to households, and pays them a nominal rate of return Re
t+1. Perfect competition in the banking sector
implies that the following bank’s zero pro￿t condition holds in each period:
h
1   Ft

 !
HR;r
t+1
i
Z
HR;r
t+1 B
HR;r
t+1
| {z }
revenuefrom non bankrupt entrepreneurs
+(1   )
  !
HR;r
t+1
0
!HR;rdF
 
!HR;r
1 + R
k;HR;r
t+1

Q  k0;t  K
HR;r
t+1
| {z }
revenue;after monitoring cost;frombankruptentrepreneurs
=
 
1 + Re
t+1

B
HR;r
t+1 | {z }
payment to households
; (A.7)
where Ft
 
!HR;r
is the cumulative distribution function of !HR;r. Let k
HR;r
t+1 =
Q  k0;t
 K
HR;r
t+1
N
HR;r
t+1
denote
the ratio of capital expenditures to net worth. Combining (A.6) with (A.7) and using the de￿nition
of k
HR;r
t+1 yields
h
 t

 !
HR;r
t+1

  Gt

 !
HR;r
t+1
i
k
HR;r
t+1
1 + R
k;HR
t+1
1 + Re
t+1
= k
HR;r
t+1   1 ;
where Gt

 !
HR;r
t+1

=
  !
HR;r
t+1
0 !HR;rdF
 
!HR;r
and  t

 !
HR;r
t+1

=  !
HR;r
t+1
h
1   Ft

 !
HR;r
t+1
i
+Gt

 !
HR;r
t+1

.
The term  t

 !
HR;r
t+1

represents the share of entrepreneurial earnings received by the bank and
Gt

 !
HR;r
t+1

the expected monitoring costs. Therefore 1  t

 !
HR;r
t+1

is the share of pro￿ts going to
the entrepreneur.
The contract determines the division of the expected pro￿ts between borrower and lender. In particular,
the optimal contract maximizes the entrepreneur’s expected return at time t + 1 subject to the zero
40pro￿t condition on banks. The optimal contracting problem may be written in the following way:
max
fk
HR;r
t+1 ; !
HR;r
t+1 g
Et
h
1    t

 !
HR;r
t+1
i
1+R
k;HR
t+1
1+Re
t+1 k
HR;r
t+1

subject to
h
 t

 !
HR;r
t+1

  Gt

 !
HR;r
t+1
i
k
HR;r
t+1
1+R
k;HR
t+1
1+Re
t+1 = k
HR;r
t+1   1 :
Entrepreneurial net worth
After the loan contract received in t   1 is settled, the entrepreneurial equity, V
HR;r
t , is given by
V
HR;r
t =

1 + R
k;HR
t

Q  k0;t 1  K
HR;r
t  
2
6
41 + Re
t +

  !
HR;r
t
0 !HR;rdFt 1
 
!HR;r
1 + R
k;HR
t

Q  k0;t 1  K
HR;r
t
Q  k0;t 1  K
HR;r
t   N
HR;r
t
3
7
5

Q  k0;t 1  K
HR;r
t   N
HR;r
t

:
Equity depends on the pro￿ts accumulated from the entrepreneur’s activities. The ￿rst term represents
the proceeds from selling undepreciated capital to capital producers, plus the rental income of capital,
net of the costs of utilization (see equation A.5). The term in squared brackets represents the gross
rate of return paid by entrepreneur on time- (t   1) loans.
At this point, to ensure that entrepreneur does not accumulate enough net worth to be fully self-
￿nanced, CMR assume that there is a constant probability of death. Namely, in each period en-
trepreneur exits the economy with probability 1   
HR. In this case, entrepreneur rebates his equity
to households in a lump-sum way:
transfer to households =
 
1   
HR
V
HR;r
t :
To keep the population constant, 1   
HR entrepreneurs are born each period. Entrepreneurial net
worth, N
HR;r
t+1 , combines the total equity and a transfer received from households, W
e;HR;r
t , and is
given by N
HR;r
t+1 = 
HRV
HR;r
t + W
e;HR;r
t .
A feature of the debt contract is that entrepreneurs with no net worth receive no loans. Thus, if
newborn entrepreneurs receive no transfers, they would have zero net worth and would therefore not
be able to purchase any capital. The same happens with the fraction of entrepreneurs who are bankrupt
due to a low realization of !. To avoid this situation, the 1   
HR entrepreneurs who are born and
the 
HR who survive receive the subsidy W
e;HR;r
t from households.
41Households
There is a continuum of in￿nitely lived risk averse households, indexed by j 2 [0;1]. Each household
consumes, supplies a di￿erentiated labor input and allocates his savings between riskless time deposit
and corporate bonds. As households di￿er in hours worked and in income, one would expect that they
would also di￿er in consumption and asset allocations. However, each household j is assumed to hold
state-contingent securities that provide insurance against household-speci￿c wage-income risk. As a
result, households are homogeneous with respect to consumption and asset holdings in equilibrium.
Therefore, in what follows, consumption and saving decisions are not indexed by j.19
Consumption and saving decisions
The instantaneous utility function of a given household is separable in consumption and hours worked
and given by:
u() = log(Ct+   bCt+ 1)    L
h
1+L
j;t+
1 + L
; (A.8)
where Ct denotes the household consumption at time t and hj;t denotes its hours worked in period t.
The parameter b > 0 measures the degree of external habit formation in consumption, L > 0 is the
inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and  L > 0 is a preference parameter that a￿ects the
disutility of supplying labor.
At the end of period t; household allocates his savings into time deposits, Tt, and corporate bonds,
CBt. At the end of period t + 1; time deposits pay a riskless rate of return equal to Re
t+1, while the
rate of return on corporate bonds is RF
t+1. We assume that both rates are known when household
makes his saving decision and are not contingent on the realization of period- (t + 1) monetary policy
shock.
The household budget constraint at time t, written in nominal terms, is given by
(1 + Re
t)Tt 1 +
 
1 + RF
t

CBt 1 + Wj;thj;t
+
 
1   
LR
(1   )V
LR;l
t +
 
1   
HR
V
HR;r
t
+IGF
t + IB
t + NCSt   CBt   Tt   PtCt   We
t   Lumpt  0 ;
19 See Erceg et al. (2000) for a discussion about the existence of state-contingent securities.
42where Wj;t is the wage earned by the household j, NCSj;t represents the net payo￿ of the state con-
tingent securities that the jth household purchases to insulate itself from the uncertainty associated
with the ability to re-optimize its wage, IGF
t and IB
t are the pro￿ts received from, respectively,
intermediate-good ￿rms and investment banks,
 
1   
HR
V
HR;r
t are the lump-sum transfers re-
ceived from riskier entrepreneurs who exit the economy,
 
1   
LR
(1   )V
LR;l
t are the lump-sum
transfers received from safer entrepreneurs who exit the economy, We
t is the total transfer payment to
entrepreneurs and Lumpt are lump-sum taxes paid to ￿nance government expenditures.
The representative household takes its consumption and saving decisions so as to maximize the expected
lifetime utility subject to its intertemporal budget constraint. The optimization problem is given by
max
fCt+;Tt+;CBt+g
Et
1 X
=0

"
log(Ct+   bCt+ 1)    L
h
1+L
j;t+
1 + L
#
subject to
 
1 + Re
t+

Tt 1+ +
 
1 + RF
t+

CBt 1+ + Wj;t+hj;t+
+
 
1   
LR
(1   )V
LR;l
t+ +
 
1   
HR
V
HR;r
t+
+IGF
t+ + IB
t+ + NCSt+   CBt+   Tt+
 Pt+Ct+   We
t+   Lumpt+  0 :
The ￿rst order conditions with respect to Tt, CBt and Ct are, respectively,
t = 
 
1 + Re
t+1

Et (t+1) (A.9)
t = 
 
1 + RF
t+1

Et (t+1) (A.10)
Ptt =
1
(Ct   bCt 1)
  b
1
(Ct+1   bCt)
; (A.11)
where t is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the households’ budget constraint. Equation (A.9)
represents the standard Euler equation. The right hand side of (A.11) is the marginal utility of
consumption, taking into account habit persistence. Comparing (A.9) and (A.10), it must hold that
RF
t+1 = Re
t+1 8t, i.e. the return on corporate bonds equals the return on time deposits, which in turn is
equal to the central bank nominal interest rate. This result is due to the assumption that both interest
rates are known when household makes his optimal decision and are not contingent on the realization
of period-(t + 1) monetary policy shock.
43Labor supply and wage setting
Each household is a monopolistic supplier of a di￿erentiated labor service, hj;t, to the production
sector. Labor services are bundled together using the aggregator function Li;t =
h 1
0 (hj;t)
1
w dj
iw
,
where w, 1 > w  1, represents the wage markup. The demand curve for the jth household
specialized labor services is hj;t =

Wj;t
Wt
 w
1 w Li;t, and the aggregate nominal wage, Wt, is given by
Wt =
 1
o
(Wj;t)
1
1 w dj
1 w
: (A.12)
In each period, a fraction w of households cannot reoptimize their wages and, therefore, set their wages
according to the indexation rule Wj;t = Wj;t 1 ( )
w1 (t 1)
1 w1, where iw1, 0  w1  1, represents
the degree of wage indexation to steady-state in￿ation rate. The fraction 1   w of reoptimizing
households set their wages by maximizing
max
Wj;t
Et
1 X
=0
(w)

"
  L
h
1+L
j;t+
1 + L
+ t+Wj;t+hj;t+
#
subject to hj;t =

Wj;t
Wt
 w
1 w
Li;t :
We only consider the symmetric equilibrium in which all households choose the same ~ Wt = Wj;t. Thus,
given (A.12), the law of motion of the aggregate wage index is given by
Wt =

(1   w) ~ W
1
1 w
t + w
h
Wt 1 ( )
w1 (t 1)
1 w1
i 1
1 w
1 w
:
Resource constraint
The aggregate resource constraint is
Ct + It + GCt + 
  !t
0 !dF (!)

1 + R
k;HR
t

Q  k0;t 1
 K
HR;r
t
Pt
+a

u
HR;r
t

 K
HR;r
t + (1   )a

u
LR;l
t

 K
LR;l
t = Yt :
Government expenditures, GCt, are determined exogenously as a constant fraction, g, of ￿nal output:
44GCt = gYt and are ￿nanced by lump-sum taxes to the households. The fourth term represents ￿nal
output used by banks in monitoring riskier entrepreneurs, and the last two terms on the left hand side
capture capital utilization costs.
Aggregate variables and market clearing conditions
Aggregate net worth (NTOT
t+1 ) is de￿ned as
NTOT
t+1 = N
HR;r
t+1 + (1   )N
LR;l
t+1 :
Total credit (BTOT
t+1 ) is de￿ned as the sum of bank loans and bonds issued and is given by:
BTOT
t+1 = B
HR;r
t+1 + (1   )BI
LR;l
t+1 :
The capital rental market clearing conditions are:
 1
0
KHR
i;t di = KHR
t = K
HR;r
t = u
HR;r
t  K
HR;r
t
and
 1
0
KLR
i;t di = KLR
t = (1   )K
LR;l
t = (1   )u
LR;l
t  K
LR;l
t :
Loan and bond market clearing conditions are, respectively, Tt = B
HR;r
t+1 and CBt = (1   )BI
LR;l
t+1 .
The market clearing condition in the labor market is: Lt =
 1
0
h 1
0 (hj;t)
1
w dj
iw

di.
Finally, the total transfer from households ( We
t ) to entrepreneurs must satisfy
We
t = W
e;HR;r
t + (1   )W
e;LR;l
t :
45Appendix B - Model solution
This appendix reports the details on how we solved the model. The solution strategy involves lin-
earization around the model’s nonstochastic steady state. We ￿rst solve numerically the model, for
the steady state, using the computational procedure described later in this appendix. We then employ
the Dynare software package to compute the ￿rst-order Taylor series approximation of the equilibrium
conditions in the neighborhood of the steady state.
In what follows, we adopt the following scaling notation:
qt =
Q  k0
Pt
; n;t = tPt ; w
e;LR;l
t =
W
e;LR;l
t
Pt
; w
e;HR;r
t =
W
e;HR;r
t
Pt
;
n
HR;r
t+1 =
N
HR;r
t+1
Pt
; n
LR;l
t+1 =
N
LR;l
t+1
Pt
:
The equations that characterize the model’s equilibrium, expressed in scaled form, are listed below.
 Investment bank
￿ elasticity (normal times)
"normal
t+1 =  " + 1
 
Yt    Y

(B.1)
￿ coupon rate (normal times)
1 + R
coupon;normal
t+1 =
"normal
t+1
"normal
t+1   1
 
1 + Re
t+1

(B.2)
￿ spread (normal times)
spreadnormal
t+1 =
1
"normal
t+1   1
 
1 + Re
t+1

(B.3)
￿ optimism
t = t 1 + (1   )
h
  + 2

n
LR;l
t+1   nLR;l
i
(B.4)
￿ coupon rate (with optimism)
1 + R
coupon;optimistic
t+1 =
"normal
t+1 (1 + t)
"normal
t+1 (1 + t)   1
 
1 + Re
t+1

(B.5)
46 Intermediate-good ￿rms
￿ arbitrage condition for the choice of capital services
r
k;HR
t
r
k;LR
t
=
 
u
HR;r
t  K
HR;r
t
u
LR;l
t  K
LR;l
t
! 1
(B.6)
￿ two measure of marginal costs
st =

 + (1   )

~ wt
1   
1  
+(1 )
"

r
k;HR
t

u
HR;r
t  K
HR;r
t
 1
#  
+(1 )
(Yt)
( 1)
+(1 ) (B.7)
st =
r
k;HR
t


ht
Kt
1  
u
HR;r
t  K
HR;r
t
 1 h


u
HR;r
t  K
HR;r
t

+ (1   )

u
LR;l
t  K
LR;l
t
i 1
 1
(B.8)
where
Kt =
h


u
HR;r
t  K
HR;r
t

+ (1   )

u
LR;l
t  K
LR;l
t
i 1

(B.9)
 Capital producers
￿ ￿rst order condition with respect to investment
n;tqt
"
1  
S
00
2

It
It 1
  1
2
  S
00 It
It 1

It
It 1
  1
#
  n;t
+n;t+1qt+1S
00

It+1
It
2 
It+1
It
  1

= 0 (B.10)
￿ aggregate stock of physical capital
  K
HR;r
t+1 + (1   )  K
LR;l
t+1 = (1   )
h
  K
HR;r
t + (1   )  K
LR;l
t
i
+
"
1  
S
00
2

It
It 1
  1
2#
It (B.11)
 Riskier entrepreneur and retail bank
47￿ ￿rst order condition with respect to capital utilization
r
k;HR
t = a
0 
u
HR;r
t

(B.12)
￿ de￿nition of rate of return on capital
1 + R
k;HR
t =
t
qt 1
nh
u
HR;r
t r
k;HR
t   a

u
HR;r
t
i
+ (1   )qt
o
(B.13)
￿ standard debt contract
Et
(
[1    t ( !t+1)]
1 + R
k;HR
t+1
1 + Re
t+1
+
 
0
t ( !t+1)
 
0
t ( !t+1)   G
0
t ( !t+1)
"
[ t ( !t+1)   Gt ( !t+1)]
1 + R
k;HR
t+1
1 + Re
t+1
  1
#)
= 0 (B.14)
￿ zero pro￿t condition for bank
[ t ( !t)   Gt ( !t)]
qt 1  K
HR;r
t
n
HR;r
t
1 + R
k;HR
t
1 + Re
t
=
qt 1  K
HR;r
t
n
HR;r
t
  1 (B.15)
￿ net worth
n
HR;r
t+1 = 
HRqt 1
t
 K
HR;r
t

R
k;HR
t   Re
t   
  !t
0
!dFt 1 (!)

1 + R
k;HR
t

+
HRn
HR;r
t
t
(1 + Re
t) + w
e;HR;r
t (B.16)
 Safer entrepreneur
￿ de￿nition of rate of return on capital
1 + R
k;LR
t =
t
qt 1
nh
u
LR;l
t r
k;LR
t   a

u
LR;l
t
i
+ (1   )qt
o
(B.17)
￿ ￿rst order condition with respect to capital utilization
r
k;LR
t = a
0 
u
LR;l
t

(B.18)
48￿ ￿rst order condition with respect to capital
qt
 
1 + R
coupon
t+1

= Et
n
t+1
h
u
LR;l
t+1 r
k;LR
t+1   a

u
LR;l
t+1

+ (1   )qt+1
io
(B.19)
￿ net worth
n
LR;l
t+1 = 
LRqt 1
t
 K
LR;l
t

R
k;LR
t   R
coupon
t

+

LR
t
(1 + R
coupon
t )n
LR;l
t + w
e;LR;l
t (B.20)
 Households
￿ ￿rst order condition with respect to time deposits
n;t =

t+1
 
1 + Re
t+1

n;t+1 (B.21)
￿ ￿rst order condition with respect to consumption
n;t =
1
(ct   bct 1)
  b
1
(ct+1   bct)
(B.22)
 Aggregate resource constraint and production function
Ct + It + 
h

  !t
0 !dF (!)

1 + R
k;HR
t

qt 1  K
HR;r
t
t
i
+a

u
HR;r
t

 K
HR;r
t + (1   )a

u
LR;l
t

 K
LR;l
t = (1   g)Yt (B.23)
Yt = K
t h
1 
t (B.24)
 Conditions associated with Calvo sticky prices and wages
n;tYt + p


1 1
t
t+1
 1
1 f
Fp;t+1   Fp;t = 0 (B.25)
n;tYtfst + p


1 1
t
t+1
 
f
f  1
Kp;t+1   Kp;t = 0 (B.26)
ht
n;t
w
+ w
 
1
t+1
wt+1
wt
! w
1 w  

1 w1
t
 1
1 w
t+1
Fw;t+1   Fw;t = 0 (B.27)
49h
1+L
t + w
"

1 w1
t
t+1
wt+1
wt
# w(1+L)
1 w
Kw;t+1   Kw;t = 0 (B.28)
Kp;t = Fp;t
2
6
6
6
4
1   p
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
1 1
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 1
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7
7
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(B.29)
Kw;t = Fw;t
~ wt
 L
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 1
1 w
1   w
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1 w(1+L)
(B.30)
 Other variables
￿ External ￿nance premium
Pe
t =  !t+1

1 + R
k;HR
t+1
 qt  K
HR;r
t+1
qt  K
HR;r
t+1   n
HR;r
t+1
 
 
1 + Re
t+1

(B.31)
￿ Contractual, no-default interest rate on entrepreneurial debt
Zt =  !t+1

1 + R
k;HR
t+1
 qt  K
HR;r
t+1
qt  K
HR;r
t+1   n
HR;r
t+1
(B.32)
￿ Aggregate net worth
nTOT
t+1 = n
HR;r
t+1 + (1   )n
LR;l
t+1 (B.33)
￿ Bond amount
BI
LR;l
t+1 = qt  K
LR;l
t+1   n
LR;l
t+1 (B.34)
￿ Bank loans
B
HR;r
t+1 = qt  K
HR;r
t+1   n
HR;r
t+1 (B.35)
￿ Safer entrepreneur’s leverage
lev
LR;l
t+1 =
qt  K
LR;l
t+1
n
LR;l
t+1
(B.36)
￿ Riskier entrepreneur’s leverage
lev
HR;r
t+1 =
qt  K
HR;r
t+1
n
HR;r
t+1
(B.37)
50￿ Total credit (bank loans + bonds)
BTOT
t+1 = B
HR;r
t+1 + (1   )BI
LR;l
t+1 (B.38)
 Monetary policy rule
Re
t = ~ Re
t 1 + (1   ~ )

Re +  (Ett+1    ) + y
 
Yt    Y

+ "MP
t (B.39)
Steady state
The strategy used for computing the steady state in this model follows the approach used by Christiano
et al. (2003). We set one of the endogenous variables of the model to a value that seems reasonable
based on empirical evidence, making this variable exogenous in the steady-state calculation. We then
move a model’s exogenous variable into the list of variables that are endogenous in the steady-state
calculation. This approach allows us to simplify the problem of computing the steady state.
We set the steady-state rental rate of capital of the riskier entrepreneur, rk;HR, to 0:0504, in line with
the value used by CMR, and we choose the parameter  L in (A.8) as endogenous variable. The set of
endogenous variables is:
t ; st ; It ;  !t ; R
k;HR
t ; R
k;LR
t ;  K
HR;r
t ;  K
LR;l
t ; Kt ; n
HR;r
t ; n
LR;l
t ;qt ; n;t ; Ct ; ~ wt ; ht ;
r
k;LR
t ; Re
t ; Fp;t ; Fw;t ;Kp;t ; Kw;t ; Yt ;  L ;u
HR;r
t ; u
LR;l
t ;
"normal
t ; R
coupon;normal
t ; R
coupon;optimistic
t ; t ; spreadnormal
t+1 ;
Pext
t ; Zt ; B
HR;r
t ; BI
LR;l
t ; BTOT
t ; lev
HR;r
t ; lev
LR;l
t ; nTOT
t ;
and the equations available for computing the steady-state value for these variables are (B.1)-(B.39).
As in Woodford (2003), steady-state in￿ation is set to zero, that is,   = 1. From (B.12) and (B.18)
uHR;r = uLR;l = 1 and  = 0 from equation (B.4). Solve for Re and q using (B.21) and (B.10).
Use (B.1) to compute "normal. Solve for the steady state of Rcoupon;normal, Rcoupon;optimistic and
spreadnormal using, respectively, (B.2), (B.5) and (B.3). Take the ratio of (B.25) and (B.26) to obtain
the value for s. Equation (B.19) can be used to obtain rk;LR, and then substitute it in (B.17) to get
the value for R
k;LR
t .
51Now we set rk;HR = 0:0504 and solve for Rk;HR using (B.13). Then solve the non-linear system
composed by equations (B.14)-(B.16) to obtain the values for nHR;r,  ! and  KHR;r. From (B.6) we get
the value for  KLR;l. Solve for nLR;l, Kt and I using (B.20), (B.9) and (B.11), respectively. Solve (B.8)
for h and then (B.24) for Y . Then use (B.7) and (B.23) to solve for ~ w and C. Get n using (B.22).
Equations (B.25), (B.27) and (B.28) can be used to obtain Fp, Fw and Kw. It then follows from (B.29)
that Kp = Fp. Finally, solve for  L using (B.30). The remaining variables are trivial functions of the
structural parameters and other steady-state values and are computed using equations (B.31)-(B.38).
In these calculations, all variables must be positive, and  KHR;r > nHR;r > 0,  KLR;l > nLR;l > 0 and
Z > Rcoupon.
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